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Abstract—Over the last two decades, the scale and com-
plexity of Anonymous networks and its associated technologies
grows exponentially as privacy has become a major concern
of individuals. Also, some cyber attackers make use of privacy
infrastructures including botnets and Tor to do illegal activities
like drug, contraband or DDoS attack. However, anonymous
networks are not perfect, there are some methods could exploit
the vulnerabilities and track user information. In this paper, we
analyze few of privacy infrastructures and their vulnerabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid and development of Internet, privacy has
become a major concern of people. Also, the open natural of
Internet encouraged illegitimate activities such as stealing user
personal information, attacking advertising companies, view-
ing sensitive content and so on. Hence, privacy infrastructure
emerged as a solution, VPN and Tor are typical examples for
such systems [1]. These systems are responsible for hiding
the identities for communicating peers and content of Internet
flows from eavesdroppers. From the adversaries perspective,
an anonymous system should have:
1) Unlink-ability, the inability to link two or more items
of interest.
2) Unobservability, items of interest are indistinguishable
from all other items.
However, privacy infrastructure still have vulnerabilities.
For example, Dan Egerstad, a Swedish hacker, set up a rogue
Tor exit node and intercepted the data that came through it in
2007. He successfully intercepted the emails and mail pass-
words of government, embassy, NGO and corporate staffers.
In this paper, we analyze VPN and Tor, and their possible
vulnerabilities.
We present a brief background and possible vulnerabilities
for above topics.
II. VPN
A. Background
Virtual Private Network (VPN) is one of the well-known
privacy infrastructure that has been trending in the past few
years. It is a private network server provides secured commu-
nication to the destination by encrypting the traffic between
the user and server [2]. VPN is a convenient and efficient
means of connecting to the private network. Even though VPN
offers secured communication, mitigating the risk of man in
the middle attack, users privacy is not guaranteed.
B. Vulnerabilities of VPN
1) VPN provider leak information, There are many cases
where VPN providers share users information for busi-
ness profit.
2) Unreliability of VPN service, many VPN providers
only use Weak Security protocol and offer Basic Encryp-
tion System, which hackers can easily compromised.
This put their users at risk.
3) Statistical Inference Attacks, Statistical analysis of
traffic patterns can compromise anonymity, i.e. the tim-
ing and size of packets.
C. VORACLE: an attack on VPN
This attack was presented by Ahamed Nafeez[3], a security
researcher, in Black Hat and DEF CON security conferences
this year. In this attack, adversary can recover HTTP traffic
was sent through an encrypted VPN under certain condition.
It is not a brand new attack. Actually, it is mixed of some
existed cryptographic attacks, such as BREACH, TIME, and
CRIME. In the previous years, attacker can recover data from a
encrypted TLS connection, if the data was compressed before
encrypted. Security researcher have deployed the fixes of this
attack in 2012 and 2013. Similarly, this attack can still valid
in some types of VPN. In those VPN, server or client will
compress data before encrypted it. In VORACLE attack, target
can be secrets, it can be cookie, pages, or some sensitive
information. If VPN services was built based on OpenVPN,
it can be target of VORACLE attack. The reason is that
OpenVPN protocol uses default setting that compresses all
data before encrypted it via TLS and after that, they will be
send in VPN channel. Attacker will lure a user to a HTTP
site, this site can be controlled by attacker or run attacker’s
malicious code, such as some malicious ads. In that way,
attacker can steal user’s secrets.
VORACLE can be prevent by not using OpenVPN based
services, or using some Chrome-based browsers to defend
malicious codes. OpenVPN have modified their docs page but
they didn’t modify defaul setting. Now, OpenVPN group have
added an alert in their project. They will discuss in the future
can fix it after that.
III. TOR
A. Background
Tor is a low latency anonymity overlay network that is
known to be the most privacy tool. It’s the largest, most well
deployed anonymity preserving service on the Internet since
publicly available at 2002.
The basic design is a mix network with improvements, all
traffic is protected with anonymous layers of encryption. When
packets are transmitted, a random path with three nodes are
used to make sure no single node is know the complete trans-
mission path. Furthermore, Tor provide additional services:
1) Perfect forward secrecy, Tor connections are encrypted
by TLS protocol, the client negotiates a new public key
pair with each relay, original key pairs only used for
signatures.
2) Introduces guards to improve source anonymity, Tor
selects 3 guard relays and uses them for 3 months, then
select 3 new guard. Guard relays help prevent attackers
from becoming the first relay.
3) Takes bandwidth into account when selecting relays,
help to reduce the latency.
4) Introduces hidden services, servers that are only acces-
sible via the Tor overlay. Tor allows you to run a server
and have people connect without disclosing the IP or
DNS name, that helps hiding the destination of traffic.
B. Vulnerabilities of Tor
Connection between exit node and destination is not en-
crypted and hence exit nodes can observe the content of
messages. Dan Egerstad, a Swedish hacker, set up a Tor exit
node and successfully intercepted the data that came through
it.
Predecessor attack is also a popular attack on anonymous
systems like Tor. Suppose there are N total relays in Tor
network, M of which are controlled by an attacker, the
attacker goal is to control the first and last relay. It’s roughly
(M/N)2 chance overall, for a single circuit. However, client
periodically builds new circuits, the attacker just looks for the
most frequent predecessor. Since routers are uniformly chosen,
it should be unlikely that you have the same predecessor for
the same session unless that predecessor us actually the entry
TOR router.
Last, Roger Dingledline mentioned that Tor client has 25%
to 30% probability to select 5 fastest tor routers as relays. In
fact, 80% traffic of Tor network is depend on 40 to 50 Tor
routers. Providing 40 to 50 fast Tor routers is not difficult for
any country’s intelligence agency.
IV. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK
A. Background
Side channel attack is any attack based on obtaining in-
formation on computer system (memory), vulnerabilities of
algorithm, such as timing information, power consumption etc.
Side channel attack is hard to find but also hard to defend.
B. Side Channels in Multi-Tenant Environments
Professor Reiter from University of North Carolina was
working on side channel attack for many years[4]. In the
previous years, he focused on attack on Timing channel and
Storage channel.
In some Cloud services, most of side channel attack is
through cache attack, so we need to design some pattern or
algorithm to defense these cache-based attack.
There are two example of cloud, IaaS Clouds and PaaS
Clouds. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS)[5] is one of com-
puting infrastructure. IaaS is perfered in some certain scenar-
ios, such as test and development, website hosting, storage,
backup, and recovery, web apps, high-performance computing,
big data analysis, etc. There are some advantages of IaaS:
1) Eliminates capital expense and reduces ongoing cost
2) Improves business continuity and disaster recovery
3) Innovate rapidly
4) Respond quicker to shifting business conditions
5) Focus on your core business
6) Increase stability, reliability, and supportability
7) Better security
8) Gets new apps to users faster
Platform as a service (PaaS)[6] is another kind of computing
infrastructure. It often be used in development framework,
analytics or business intelligence or additional servives. There
are also some advantages of PaaS:
1) Cut coding time
2) Add development capabilities without adding staff
3) Develop for multiple platforms - including mobile - more
easily
4) Use sophisticated tools affordably
5) Support geographically distributed development teams
6) Efficiently manage the application lifecycle
Here are three attacks can be work on these system: Prime-
Probe Attacks, Flush-Reload Attacks[7] and Password Reset
Attack. The core of these attack is manipulating memory.
Take Prime-Probe Attacks as an example, clear cache of target
and add some pivot in cache. When the system want to read
something in cache, attacker can calculate the target data
address based on memory reading time.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, three kinds of privacy infrastructures, VPN,
Tor and side channel, are discussed and the vulnerabilities of
them are analyzed. Since Tor is the most important privacy
infrastructure, it attracts many companies and organizations to
investigate its vulnerability. Further research is recommended
to how to exploit the vulnerabilities of Tor.
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